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1. Executive summary 
 
1.1 This survey was commissioned by the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory 
Authority (ACRA). In this survey, the Singapore Management University 
examined external auditor oversight through the lenses of audit committee (AC) 
chairs in relation to the appointment, change, and oversight activities in Singapore 
listed companies.  
1.2 Communication was a common thread across two of these key activities.  
Communication would involve the accessibility, openness and the effectiveness of 
interaction between the external auditors and audit committees. 
 
Key observations for audit committees 
1.3 There was a high degree of awareness and consensus among AC chairmen on key 
attributes / best practices over the appointment and oversight activities of the 
external auditors, as articulated by the Guidebook for Audit Committees in 
Singapore.   
1.4 With respect to change of auditors, there appears to be less consensus over what 
could be the key considerations involved in their decision-making process. This 
could be partially explained by the lack of guidance in this process, where the 
Guidebook for Audit Committees in Singapore is currently silent.   
1.5 ACs exercise the strongest influence throughout the key processes, with 
management influence varying according to the nature of activities.  Management 
involvement appears to be most evident in the audit fee setting process.  Inputs 
from management should not be viewed unfavorably, as they could contribute 
positively towards the process.  
  
Key observations for external auditors 
1.6 In the appointment of external auditor, ACs placed great importance on the audit 
partner’s independence, responsiveness to meeting deadlines and audit issues, 
communication of major issues, trustworthiness, and the audit partner’s 
involvement. On the other hand, in the change of the external auditor, 
communication of major issues, unreasonable audit fees and knowledge of 
industry were key impetuses for the change. AC oversight activities placed 
importance on financial reporting risk and accessibility. For financial reporting 
risk, these key oversight activities were: (i) the review of major audit findings; 
and (ii) issues raised in the external auditor’s management letter.  For 
accessibility, these key activities included (i) the external auditor’s access to the 
AC; and (ii) the AC’s access to the auditor without the presence of management. 
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1.7 The audit committee exercised the most influence in all the oversight activities. 
Therefore, it is important for external auditors to work well with their audit 
committees.   
 
 
 
2. Introduction 
 
2.1 In Singapore, the regulation of public accountants comes under the purview of the 
Public Accountants Oversight Committee1 (PAOC), which is a board committee 
of the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA) and is established 
under the Accountants Act (Cap. 2). In addition to issuing annual practising 
certificates to public accountants, the PAOC administers the practice monitoring 
programme (PMP)2. The PMP involves a detailed review of the engagement files 
of a public accountant’s work for compliance with relevant auditing standards.  
For public accountants who audit public interest entities, the PMP includes a 
review of their system of quality controls and compliance effectiveness.   
 
2.2  Oversight of public accountants or external auditors occurs at two points in the 
regulatory process. The first is during the registration of a public accountant, 
when the suitability of the applicant is reviewed and assessed. The second is 
during PMP through the output reviews of selected audit files to assess the quality 
of audit performance. While ACRA has maintained the overall rigor of the auditor 
oversight regime, what is little known are the processes and considerations from 
the companies, and in particular the ACs, in the appointment, evaluation, and 
change of statutory auditors. 
 
 
 
3.  Survey objectives 
 
3.1  Companies, as “consumers” of audit services, are an important and integral part of 
the audit oversight value chain. There is presently no research on how the 
oversight of external auditors is performed by companies in Singapore. The 
motivation for this joint study undertaken by ACRA and the School of 
Accountancy, Singapore Management University, is to fill the information gap on 
the current oversight practices of the ACs pertaining to external auditors in 
Singapore. A holistic understanding of the audit oversight value chain enhances 
audit quality and the veracity of financial reporting in Singapore.   
 
                                                            
1 http://www.acra.gov.sg/About_ACRA/Public_Accountants_Oversight_Committee.htm 
2 http://www.acra.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/96E3EA68-4CCC-4214-A574-
DEE170D71C5C/3917/FRRD_ReplaceexistingpdffileofPEPReport2007_2407200.pdf 
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3.2  Section 201B (5) of the Companies Act stipulates the functions of the AC. These 
include the nomination and review of the external auditor’s performance. Against 
this regulatory backdrop, this survey obtained the views of AC chairmen on their 
external auditor oversight practices. 
 
3.3 More specifically, the objectives of this survey of AC Chairmen are to provide a 
better understanding of the AC external auditor oversight practices in relation to 
the following: 
 
• What factors influence the appointment decisions of the external auditors? 
• What factors influence the decisions to change the external auditors?    
• What are the important audit committee oversight activities? 
• Who has the greatest influence over key external auditor oversight 
processes? 
• What are the key messages that can be derived from the survey 
observations for audit committees and external auditors? 
 
3.4   This report presents the results of responses to each survey question. It also 
includes an analysis of the implications of the key findings. 
 
 
 
4.   Scope and methodology 
 
4.1  The scope of this survey covers AC chairmen of 640 companies listed on the main 
board and Catalist of the Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX) as at 30th April 
2009. Foreign companies which operate as secondary listings in Singapore are 
excluded from this survey as they may be exempted from certain SGX listing 
requirements.  
 
4.2  The survey questionnaire contents are fashioned closely to the Guidebook for 
Audit Committees in Singapore (hereinafter referred to as the ACGC Guidebook) 
which was issued by ACRA, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and 
SGX. The ACGC Guide also provides the framework for the understanding and 
analysis of the results of this fact-finding survey. 
 
4.3  Section 1 of the questionnaire maps the respondents’ profiles. Section 2 covers 
the roles of key stakeholders and criteria adopted in the appointment of external 
auditors. Section 3 seeks respondents’ views on the types of AC oversight 
activities over external auditors. Section 4 covers audit fees, AC meetings and 
communication with external auditors. Where the five-point Likert scale is used to 
calibrate the response, the score is interpreted in the following manner: (1) to a 
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very little extent; (2) to a little extent; (3) to some extent; (4) to a great extent; and 
(5) to a very great extent. 
 
 
 
5. Profile of respondents 
 
Chart 1: AC Chairs’ Experience  Chart 2 : Formal Qualifications 
 
                
 
5.1  A total of 96 usable responses were received. Forty-three percent of respondents 
were from the manufacturing sector. Respondents served an average of 10.7 years 
as directors and held 3.9 directorships. Twelve percent sat on more than six 
boards, and the largest number registered was 13 directorships. Seventy-seven 
percent has formal accounting/finance qualifications. 
 
5.2  Respondents served an average of 7.9 years as AC chairmen and currently held 
this position in 2.7 companies. Eighteen percent were simultaneously AC 
chairmen of five to six companies. Seventy-seven percent of respondents’ existing 
external auditors have served as their auditors for more than three years. The 
longest serving was over 50 years. In summary, respondents in this survey were 
relatively well-qualified and experienced. 
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6.     Key findings   
 
6.1  Appointment of external auditors 
 
6.1.1  Appointment criteria   
 
(i) The rank, appointment criteria, mean, and standard deviation; respectively, are 
shown for each item in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: External Auditor (EA) Appointment  Criteria 
Rank  Category  Mean  Std Dev 
1  Independence of the EA  4.52  0.82 
2  Ability to meet deadlines & timely response to issues  4.41  0.66 
3  Communication of issues and major concerns to the AC  4.40  0.72 
4  Level of comfort & trust in the EA  4.30  0.78 
5  Audit engagement partner's involvement  4.20  0.79 
6  Audit firm's reputation  4.07  0.82 
7  Audit partner ‐ knowledge of the industry  4.01  0.74 
8  Proactive in providing technical updates  3.97  0.76 
9  Quality control within the EA firm  3.97  0.88 
10  Audit engagement partner's reputation  3.94  0.83 
11  Reasonableness of the audit fee  3.94  0.68 
12  EA's audit approach / methodology  3.83  0.74 
13  Audit partner ‐ knowledge of the company  3.77  0.75 
14  Audit firm's international representation and network  3.72  0.88 
15  EA's relationship and experience with regulators  3.60  0.83 
  
(ii) The overall mean score for the 15 appointment criteria is 4.04. This high score 
implies that respondents generally considered these criteria important in 
appointment decisions. 
 
(iii) Table 1 ranks the average scores for all appointment criteria. Independence of the 
external auditor, ability to meet deadlines, external auditor’s candidness and 
effectiveness in communicating issues and concerns to the AC, the level of 
comfort and trust in the external auditor, and audit partner’s involvement in the 
audit are in the top quartile. However, audit fee, audit methodology adopted, 
partner’s knowledge of the company, audit firm’s international representation and 
network, and the external auditor’s relationship with regulators are ranked at the 
bottom quartile. Nevertheless, they are moderately pertinent to appointment 
decisions. 
 
(iv) The highest mean score emerged for independence, the cornerstone of the external 
audit, and this was not surprising. Against today’s economic backdrop, external 
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auditor’s candidness and effectiveness in communicating key audit issues are also 
critical appointment drivers. The AC chairs’ perceptions of the external auditors’ 
responsiveness and ability to minimize regulatory risk in relation to meeting 
statutory and reporting deadlines, their level of comfort and trust with the external 
auditors, and the extent of audit partners’ involvement in the audits, are very 
important in the appointment agenda, as anticipated. 
 
(v) Audit fees, or the cost factor, do matter to respondents. Audit quality, as 
represented by the partner’s knowledge of the company, the audit firm’s 
international representation and network, and audit methodology, are of moderate 
importance in the appointment radar screen. With increasing complexity in the 
reporting environment, the AC chairs view the auditors’ relationship with the 
relevant regulatory agencies moderately important in mitigating their regulatory 
risks. 
 
 (vi) Controlling for experience, qualification, listing status (i.e. main board and 
Catalist), size (as measured by revenue) and industry of the respondents, yielded 
two main observations: 
      
(a)  In relation to the audit methodology adopted, respondents serving  three or 
less years as AC chairs ranked this attribute as important (i.e. mean score 
of 4.07) while those with  over three years experience as AC chairs ranked 
this factor as moderate (i.e. mean score of  3.76). With 77 percent of 
respondents’ external auditors serving over three years, a possible reason 
for this outcome is that these groups of experienced AC chairs are 
relatively more familiar with their auditors’ approaches to the audits. 
 
(b)  For audit fees, the overall mean score is on the upper end of the moderate 
scale (i.e. mean score of 3.96). In today’s challenging economic 
environment, AC chairs are generally cost-sensitive in preserving the 
companies’ bottom lines. Nevertheless, the respondents opined that the 
quality of external auditors’ characteristics, as reflected in the top five 
attributes, prevails over cost considerations.  
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6.2  Change of External Auditors 
   
6.2.1     Change criteria 
 
(i) The rank, change criteria, mean, and standard deviation; respectively, are shown 
for each item in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 : External Auditor (EA) Change Decision Criteria 
Rank  Category  Mean  Std Dev 
1  Lack  of communication  of major issues &  concerns to the AC  3.50  1.46 
2  Unreasonable audit fee  3.43  1.38 
3  Audit partner’s lack of knowledge ‐ Industry  3.27  1.48 
4  Audit partner’s lack of knowledge ‐ company  3.20  1.47 
5  Company's EA rotation policy  2.93  1.39 
6  Perceived lack of independence  2.70  1.58 
7  Statutory requirements on EA rotation policy  2.60  1.57 
8  Disagreement over professional  / accounting matters  2.50  1.33 
9  Previous EA resigned or declined re‐appointment  2.32  1.54 
10  Significant increase or reduction of business activities  2.17  1.23 
11  Change in EA for purpose of public listing  2.11  1.40 
12  Change in majority ownership of the company  1.71  1.12 
 
(ii) Companies generally re-appoint their incumbent external auditors. For example, 
approximately one-third of respondents indicated that they had previously 
contemplated changing auditors. Nearly 71 percent (or 27 respondents) in this 
group ultimately made the switch.  But what were the drivers of change? 
 
(iii) The overall mean score for the drivers for external change is 2.70. This relatively 
low score reflects the wide variation in responses, ranging from 1.71 to 3.5 (see 
Table 2). 
 
(iv) In the top quartile, the highest rank is the lack of candidness and effective 
communication of major issues and concerns to the AC, followed by unreasonable 
audit fee, and audit partner’s lack of knowledge of the industry. Categorizing 
these findings in terms of the external auditor’s characteristics, AC chairmen 
considered their candidness and effective communication, audit quality and cost 
as key drivers for change. 
 
(v) In the bottom quartile, the least important drivers for change are the significant 
increase or reduction of business activities, intention for public listing, and change 
in majority ownership. In other words, AC chairmen did not consider companies’ 
characteristics as important as the external auditors’ attributes in affecting their 
decisions in changing auditors. 
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(vi) Probing these responses further by respondents’ experience, qualification, listing 
status (i.e. main board and Catalist), size (as measured by revenue) and industry 
of the respondents, produced two main observations on formal qualifications.  In 
relation to unreasonable audit fees and the audit partner’s lack of knowledge of 
the industry, mean scores for those with formal qualifications were 3.82 and 3.41, 
respectively, compared with those with no formal qualifications who registered 
mean scores of 2.38 and 2.88, respectively. Although there is no substantial 
difference, those with formal qualifications are relatively more sensitive to audit 
fees and the partner’s industry knowledge in making change decisions. In other 
words, they have higher expectations of audit quality from their auditors. Yet, at 
the same time, they expect auditors to charge competitive fees.  
 
6.2.2   Auditor Changes in 2006 and 2007 
 
(i) To better understand whether there is a propensity to favour the Big 4 or non-Big 
4 CPA firms in the change decisions, a set of listed companies which changed 
auditors in 2006 and 2007 was extracted from the ACRA database. Table 3 shows 
the number of companies involved during this period. 
 
Table 3 : Frequency of  External Auditors Change in 2006 and 2007 
CPA Firms  Number of companies  Percentage 
Big 4 to Others*  38  40 
Others to Big 4  10  11 
Big 4 to Big 4  25  27 
Others to Others  20  22 
Total  93  100 
*:  Non‐Big 4 CPA firms                                                                                             Source: ACRA 
 
 (ii)  In 2006 and 2007, 93 changes of external auditors were captured in the ACRA 
database. Thirty-eight companies (40 percent) switched from the Big 4 to non- 
Big 4 firms and 10 companies (11 percent) switched from non-Big 4 firms (i.e. 
Others) to the Big 4 in the corresponding period. In summary, non-Big 4 firms   
registered a net gain of 28 companies from the Big 4, which accounted for about 
30 percent of the total changes recorded. Of these 28 net gains, 22 were registered 
in 2006.  
 
(iii)  For the 93 changes recorded, the reasons for changes were not available. 
However, from the survey of respondents, unreasonable fees were cited as one of 
the key drivers for auditor change. Were the net gains by the non-Big 4 firm fee 
motivated? To know this, one would have to analyze the fee movements for these 
93 companies upon the change of auditors in order to obtain a better 
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comprehension of any implications. Since audit fees are not publicly available, 
such an analysis is not feasible.   
 
(iv) Another issue addressed in this analysis is to assess whether companies have a 
propensity to change auditors on receipt of unfavourable or qualified audit 
opinions. Results show seven companies (8 percent) with qualified audit opinions 
in the year preceding the change of auditors (see Table 4). Five of these 
companies continued to receive qualified audit opinions by the new auditors. In 
one instance, a company had a clean audit report by its preceding auditor. 
However, the financial statements were qualified by the new auditor. Based on 
these findings, qualified audit opinion is not a key driver of auditor change. 
 
Table 4 : Audit Opinion and Auditor Change 
Audit opinion 
Number of companies 
2006                    2007 
Total 
Qualified Audit Opinions in the 
preceding year of change 
3 (7%)  4 (8%)  7 (8%) 
Clean audit opinion  42 (93%)  44 (92%)  86 (92%) 
Total  45 (100%)  48 (100%)  93 (100%) 
Source: ACRA 
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6.3  AC Oversight Activities 
 
(i) The rank, AC oversight activities, mean, and standard deviation; respectively, are 
shown for each item in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: AC Oversight Activities 
Rank  Category  Mean  Std Dev 
1  AC reviews EA's significant findings from the audit  4.59  0.66 
2  AC ensures EA has access to the AC chairman  4.51  0.75 
3  AC meets EA without the presence of management  4.48  0.79 
4  AC reviews EA's Management Letter  4.46  0.77 
5  AC reviews management's responses to key findings  4.40  0.75 
6  AC assesses EA's effectiveness in handling key a/c issues  4.39  0.72 
7  AC reviews EA's audit report  4.31  0.74 
8  EA briefs the AC on the audit plan  4.29  0.74 
9  AC reviews EA's evaluation and findings of internal controls  4.27  0.70 
10  AC monitors and assesses the EA's independence  4.26  0.90 
11  AC reviews and discusses the audit plan  4.23  0.77 
12  AC establishes  follow‐up procedures & sets  timelines    for  remedial 
actions  4.16  0.84 
13  AC monitors non‐audit services provided by EA  3.99  0.93 
14  AC reviews  the assistance given by company's staff  3.93  0.81 
15  AC obtains feedback from key staff on  the audit  3.80  0.74 
16  Audit plan is modified on the AC's reviews  3.74  0.85 
17  AC reviews the representation letter  3.70  1.12 
18  AC reviews the Letter of Engagement  3.56  0.99 
 
(ii) Upon the appointment of an external auditor, the oversight of the audit rests with 
the company. Under the Code of Corporate Governance, the AC is tasked with 
this responsibility. Table 5 lists the spectrum of oversight activities in the audit 
engagement. These activities include the review of Letter of Engagement to the 
review of the audit report. 
  
(iii) The overall mean score for responses to the 18 activities is 4.17. This relatively 
high score implies that respondents generally considered the set of activities as 
important oversight functions. 
   
(iv) Table 5 ranks the average scores for these oversight activities. Ranked in the top 
quartile is review of significant findings from the audit, followed by ensuring that 
the external auditor has access to the AC chairman, ensuring that the AC meets 
with the external auditor without the presence of management, the review of 
management letter, and the review of the management’s responses to key 
findings. 
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(v)  Generally, AC chairmen placed priority on three specific areas: significant 
reporting risks; auditor’s access to the AC chair; and management’s responses to 
audit issues. With the increasing complexity in the business landscape, AC chairs 
expect the external auditor to report and communicate formally, and informally, 
to be aware of significant audit findings and reporting issues to better discharge 
their oversight responsibilities. This information facilitates their follow-up actions 
by ensuring that management adequately responds to these issues. 
  
(iv) Oversight activities in the bottom quartile are: reviewing assistance given by 
company staff to the external auditor, obtaining feedback from key staff on the 
audit, reviewing that the audit plan is modified based on AC’s review, reviewing 
the representation letter and the Letter of Engagement. They can be broadly 
classified into three themes: (a) terms of audit engagement, (b) auditor 
performance, and (c) support for the auditors. Although clustered in the bottom 
quartile of the table, they are of moderate importance to respondents as these 
activities are aligned with the Guidebook for Audit Committees in Singapore.  
 
6.4   Influence over the appointment, change, audit fees and AC oversight activities 
   
(i) Respondents were asked for their opinions regarding who has the greatest 
influence in decisions relating to the appointment of external auditor, change of 
external auditor, establishing the audit fees, and AC external auditor oversight 
activities. The ACs, collectively, and the AC chairs, exerted the most influence 
over these key oversight processes (67 percent), followed by the executives or 
management comprising Board chairs (10 percent), Other Board members (9 
percent), CEO (7 percent), CFO (6  percent) and Internal Auditor (1 percent) as 
shown in Table 6.  
 
   
Table 6 : Influence over the Appointment, Change, Audit Fees and AC Oversight Activities 
(in percentage) 
Participants  Appointment 
Auditor 
Change  Audit Fee 
AC  Oversight 
Activities 
Overall 
Influence 
Collective decision of the AC  51  50  44  55  50 
Chairman of the AC  24  18  10  19  17 
Chairman of the Board  11  11  13  7  10 
Other Board members  11  11  8  6  9 
CEO  3  5  14  8  7 
CFO  ‐  5  10  5  6 
IA  ‐  ‐  1  ‐  1 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
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 (ii)  Analyzing the responses by individual processes, AC chairs and the AC together 
exerted the greatest influence over appointment (75 percent), AC oversight 
activities (74 percent), auditor change (68 percent), and audit fees (54 percent), 
respectively. Management does exert some influence over these key processes. 
However, for cost sensitive factors, such as audit fees, the management appeared 
to have a higher propensity to partake in the decision-making process. 
 
 
 
7. Implications of key findings for audit committees 
 
7.1  There are four key implications that can be drawn from this study for audit 
committees. 
 
7.1.1  Firstly, AC’s oversight practices are generally aligned with the Guidebook for 
Audit Committees in Singapore. The two illustrations to support this observation 
are as follows: 
 
(i) the high overall mean scores registered for the appointment criteria and  
oversight activities; and 
   
(ii)  respondents conducting at least one meeting with their external auditor 
during the year. 
 
7.1.2  Secondly, for the change criteria of external auditors, the overall mean score is 
moderate. Respondents’ perceptions varied due to the fact that the criteria are 
currently not being addressed by the Guidebook.  When these criteria are 
expounded in the Guidebook, the extent in which they would affect respondents’ 
perceptions is an area for future research. 
 
 7.1.3 Thirdly, while the AC chairs and the AC may have significant influence over key 
processes such as appointment, auditor change, AC oversight activities and fee 
setting, management’s influence cannot be under-estimated. It ranged from 3 
percent for appointment to 24 percent for fee setting. It reflects a dynamic AC-
management interface in decision-making. A potential challenge is how to strike a 
balance in this delicate AC-management interface to promote healthy interaction 
without compromising the veracity of financial reporting. 
 
7.1.4  Fourthly, respondents’ self-assessment on the extent of documentation in relation 
to the AC oversight activities, appointment and change of auditors, registered 
mean scores ranging from 2.96 to 3.79. Documentation is an essential element of 
good governance. It enhances consistency and accountability. These low to 
moderate mean scores suggest that respondents were of the opinion that there was 
still room for improvement in their documentation practices. 
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8. Implications of key findings for external auditors 
 
8.1   In the appointment of the external auditor, audit committees place importance on 
the audit partner’s independence, responsiveness to meeting deadlines and audit 
issues, communication of major issues, trustworthiness, and the audit partner’s 
involvement. On the other hand, in the change of the external auditor, 
communication of major issues, unreasonable audit fees and knowledge of 
industry were key impetuses for the change. Audit committees’ oversight 
activities placed importance on financial reporting risk and accessibility. For 
financial reporting risk, these key oversight activities were the review of major 
audit findings; and issues raised in the external auditor’s management letter. For 
accessibility, these key activities included the external auditor’s access to the 
audit committee; and the audit committee’s access to the auditor in the absence of 
management. 
8.2  The audit committee exercises the most influence in all the oversight activities. 
Therefore, it is important for the external auditor to work well with the audit 
committee.   
 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
9.1.  This survey provides useful insights into AC chairs’ perceptions of the important 
drivers for external auditors appointment and change, significant AC oversight 
activities, and the locus of influence over decisions in these key areas. For AC 
chairs, it is an opportunity for self-assessment and reflection of current practices 
as the content of this survey questionnaire mirrors the Guidebook for Audit 
Committees in Singapore. From the external auditors’ perspective, the key 
findings can help to direct their attention to specific issues and areas that will 
better match the expectations of the AC. 
 
9.2 Results of this survey should serve as an impetus for further research into AC 
oversight and audit quality. The scope could also be widened to involve all major 
stakeholders (e.g. regulators, auditors, AC members and management). 
